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Are Schools Liable for Student-on-Student
Sexual Harassment Under Title IX?
Davis v. Monroe County BoardofEducation1
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistics show that sixty-five percent of students in grades eight through
eleven believe that they are victims of peer sexual harassment. 2 Even more
astonishing is that recent complaints of sexual harassment include a male high
school student exposing himself to a female student3 and students engaging in
unwanted touching.4
These recent acts have contributed to the ongoing debate throughout the
federal courts about whether a school may be held liable for monetary damages
if a student sexually harasses another student while at school.5 The majority of
trial courts which have heard peer sexual harassment cases have held that a
school may be liable under Title IX for failing to respond to complaints of
harassment.6 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that schools cannot
be liable under Title IX. 7 This continuing controversy has left schools uncertain
regarding their obligations to students when faced with incidents of peer sexual

1. 120 F.3d 1390 (llth Cir. 1997), cert.granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1998) (No. 97-843).
2. Id. at 1405 (citing American Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found., Hostile
Hallways: The AAUWSurvey on Sexual Harassmentin American Schools 11 (1993)).
3. Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
4. Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
5. CompareRowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.)
(holding that school district was not liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment),
cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996), with Doe v. Londonberry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64,
74 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1373; Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist.,
956 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist.,
940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 172; Burrow v.
Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v.
Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona L-S. v. Santa
Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1460 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 365 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Doe v. Petuluna City Sch. Dist., 830
F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir.
1995), and Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that the school district may be liable under Title IX for peer sexual
harassment).
6. Doe, 970 F. Supp. at 74; Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1373; Collier,956 F. Supp.
at 1212; Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419; Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 172; Burrow, 929 F.
Supp. at 1199; Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020; OonaR.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1460; Davis,
862 F. Supp at 365; Doe, 830 F. Supp. at 1563; PatriciaH., 830 F. Supp. at 1293.
7. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015.
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harassment. The result is that some schools have even gone to the extreme of
suspending six and seven year olds for kissing other students in order to avoid
Title IX liability."
One of the most recent decisions adding to the confusion of peer sexual
harassment cases was that in Davis v. Monroe County BoardofEducation.9 In
conflict with many other courts and regulations, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in
Davis that a school could not be held liable for failure to remedy peer sexual
harassment under Title IX.
I. FACTS AND HOLDiNG

During the 1992-1993 school year, LaShonda Davis was a fifth grade
student at Hubbard Elementary School in Georgia." On several occasions
between December 1992 and May 1993, "G.F.," a male classmate of
LaShonda's, physically and verbally sexually harassed LaShonda at school."
The first incident of harassment occurred on December 17, 1992 when G.F.
directed vulgar language towards LaShonda while in class,' 3 and then attempted
to touch her breasts and genital area.' 4 G.F. engaged again in similar conduct
twice in January.' 5 After each incident, LaShonda reported the acts to Diane
Fort, her classroom teacher, and Aurelia Davis, LaShonda's mother.'6 After one
of these occurrences, LaShonda's mother contacted Fort who assured her that the
principal of the school, Bill Querry, had been notified of G.F.'s conduct. 7
However, no other action was taken at that time, and G.F. continued his
behavior.'8
From February through April of 1993, five additional incidents of
harassment occurred while LaShonda was in school, and she reported each
incident to a teacher after it occurred. 9 Overall, there were eight incidents of

8. See Katha Pollitt, Kissing & Telling, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 1996, at 9. School
administrators suspended six year old Johnathan Prevette of North Carolina for "sexual
harassment" when he kissed a girl in his class, and administrators suspended seven year
old De'Andre Dearinge of New York for "sexual harassment" when he kissed a girl and
tore a button off her skirt. Id.
9. 120 F.3d 1390 (1 th Cir. 1997), cert.granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1998) (No. 97-843).
10. Id. at 1406.
11. Id. at 1393.
12. Id.
13. Id. G.F. allegedly told LaShonda, "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want
to feel your boobs." Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1393. On February 3, 1993, G.F. placed a doorstop in his
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/7
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alleged sexual harassment, four of which LaShonda reported to Fort, two to her
gym teacher, Whit Maples, and two to her teacher Joyce Pippin.2" Despite
LaShonda notifying her teachers of the conduct, the school did little to respond
to the problem.21 For example, G.F. and LaShonda were assigned seats next to
each other in Fort's classroom, and Fort did not move him away from LaShonda
until three months after she was notified of G.F.'s misconduct.'
On May 19, 1993, LaShonda complained to her mother that she did not
know how much longer she could tolerate G.F.'s behavior.2u Davis then
contacted Principal Querry who, in turn, asked Davis why LaShonda "was the
only one complaining."24 Querry also told Davis that he would "threaten the boy
[G.F.] a little bit harder."' On the same day, G.F. was charged with sexual
battery concerning these incidents, and later pled guilty to the charge.26
Aurelia Davis then filed suit against the Board of Education of Monroe
County, Georgia (the "Board"), Charles Dumas, the superintendent of the
school, and Principal Bill Querry on behalf of her daughter, LaShonda.Y The
complaint alleged that the defendants violated Section 901 of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX")28 by failing to prevent G.F. from sexually
harassing LaShonda while they were both students at Hubbard Elementary."
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.30 Davis then appealed the dismissal of her Title IX claim against the

pants and behaved in a sexually suggestive manner toward LaShonda in gym class, and
LaShonda reported this to her gym teacher Whit Maples. Id. On February 10, 1993, and
on March 1, 1993, G.F. engaged in unspecified conduct toward LaShonda again, and
LaShonda reported this to Joyce Pippin and Maples, both teachers at Hubbard. Id. Then
on April 12, 1993, while in a school hallway, G.F. rubbed his body against LaShonda in
a suggestive manner and she complained to Fort about G.F.'s conduct. Id. The last
incident occurred on May 19, 1993, when G.F. again behaved sexually toward LaShonda,
and this was reported to the principal, Querry. Id.
20. Id. at 1394.
21. Id. at 1393.
22. Id.

23. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 365 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert.granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
29. Davis, 120 F. 3d at 1392. The original complaint also alleges that the school
violated LaShonda's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), and that the
school discriminated against LaShonda on the basis of race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994). However, the court dismissed both of these claims, and Davis did not petition the
court to rehear these rulings en banc. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1392.
30. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1392.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Board?' A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed and reinstated her
claim.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing of the panel opinion and
ultimately affirmed the district court's dismissal 3 Specifically, the court, sitting
en banc, held that Title IX does not give rise to liability of school officials who
fail to adequately respond to complaints of peer sexual harassment.34

m.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Legislative History of Title IM
In 1972, Congress passed Title IX, which states that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." ' The legislative
history indicates Congress intended for this language to be read broadly in order
to eliminate all aspects of sex discrimination in education. First, the purpose of
the bill was to bridge the gap between Title VII,36 which eliminated gender
discrimination in employment, and Title VI," which prohibited discrimination
based on race or national origin in education but did not prohibit discrimination
based on sex.3" Like Title VI, Congress intended Title IX to "reach into all
facets of education-admissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and
'
promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales."39
In addition, Title IX
extended to the prohibition of "teachers who favor male students, ind guidance
counselors who discourage [students] from many careers that have limited
numbers of women in higher levels of administration."'a

31. Id. at 1392 n.3. Davis did not appeal her Title IX claim with regard to
Superintendent Dumas and Principal Querry. Id. at 1392 n.3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1406.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII states: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual ...with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). Title VI states: "[N]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
38. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 120 F.3d 1390, 1396 (1lth Cir.
1997), cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
39. 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
40. 117 CONG. REc. 25507 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/7
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Second, the comments of several congressmen who favored the proposed
legislation indicate the bill was to have an expansive reach. 41 Senator Bayh, the

sponsor of Title IX, stated that "[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive
measure which... is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal
protection as they seek education, 4 2 and that the impact of Title IX was to be
"far reaching."4 3 Because Title IX's legislative history is sparse, the Supreme
Court has noted that "Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the
language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's
construction. '" 4
Though Congress intended Title IX to be an expansive piece of legislation,
it never discussed peer sexual harassment, and it was unclear at the time Title IX
was enacted whether the statute covered any other type of sexual harassment
claim in the education context. 4
B. Sexual Harassmentand Title IX
In Alexander v. Yale University," the federal courts first recognized that
sexual harassment in education violated Title IX. 7 In that case, the district court
stated that "it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement
conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sexual
discrimination in education," and therefore, violates Title IX."
Two years later, in Cannonv. University of Chicago,49 the Supreme Court
strengthened the district court's opinion by ruling that Title IX contains an
implied private right of action despite the absence of specific language in the

41. See 117 CONG. REc. 39,526 (1971) (debate between Reps. Green & Steiger);
117 CONG. REC. 30,158-59 (1971) (remarks of Sen. McGovern).
42. Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Shannon Browne, & Carrie Williamson, Sexual
Harassmentin Schools: An Analysis of the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability
Standardin Title 11 Peer Sexual HarassmentCases, 12 Wis. WoMEN's L.L 301,312
(1997) (citing 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972)).
43. 118 CONG. REc. 5808 (1972).
44. North Haven Bd.of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982).
45. See Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss:
Title IXand Student-to-Student Harassment,30 CREiGHToN L. REv 423 (1997).
When Congress enacted Title IX in 1972, sexual harassment was not yet
recognized as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. . ., which also
broadly proscribes sex discrimination. The first case to recognize that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII was ...twelve years
after the statute was enacted ....It is now axiomatic that sexual harassment
violates the mandate of Title VII and Title IX.
Id. at 456 n. 107.
46. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
49. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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statute to that effect." The Court stated that the private cause of action under
Title IX was "to provide individual citizens effective protection against
[discriminatory] practices."'" In North Haven Board ofEducation v. Bell,52 the
Court, as in Cannon,53 noted that Title IX was patterned after Title VI, thus
making it helpful to use prior interpretations of Title VI in examining Title IX
claims. 4 Using this logic, in November of 1982 the Court ruled that Title IX
prohibits employment discrimination in education.5 5 However, neither of these
cases were sexual harassment cases.
The Supreme Court heard its first case dealing with sexual harassment in
education in Franklinv. Gwinnett County Public School. 56 In that case, the
Court held that a student sexually harassed by her coach at school was entitled
to monetary damages from the school district under Title IX57 Justice White
stated that "Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not
to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminate[s] on
the basis of sex.' ' 5 He concluded by stating that "[this Title VII] rule should
apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student." ' 9 With this
decision, the Supreme Court verified that sexual harassment by a teacher is a
viable claim under Title IX.6o But the Court has yet to determine whether
schools are liable for peer sexual harassment under the statute.
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, courts faced with the issue of
peer sexual harassment have reached differing conclusions. Numerous district
courts have ruled that schools are liable under Title IX if they fail to prevent the
sexual harassment of a student by another student. 6' However, the Fifth Circuit

50. Id. at 677-78.
51. Id. at 704.
52. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
53. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
54. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 529.
55. Id. at 530.
56. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Doe v. Londonberry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole M.
v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Collier v.
William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (E.D. Pa.1997); Wright v. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist. 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bruneau v. South
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney
R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City
Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1460 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Doe v. Petuluma City Sch. Dist., 830
F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir.
1995); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/7
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and now the Eleventh Circuit have both ruled that plaintiffs have no cause of
action against a school under Title IX.62
63
In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,
the mother of two
children filed suit against the school district when other students continually
sexually harassed her two daughters on a school bus. 64 The Fifth Circuit held
that the school district could not be liable for peer sexual harassment under Title
IX, unless
[the] plaintiff [can] demonstrate that the school district responded to
sexual harassment claims differently based on sex. Thus, a school
district might violate Title IX if it treated sexual harassment of boys
more seriously than sexual harassment of girls, or even if it turned a
blind eye toward sexual
harassment of girls while addressing assaults
6
that harmed boys.
In other words, the school district could be liable under Title IX only if the
school itself discriminated on the basis of sex, and it could not be held liable for
third party sexual harassment.'
On the other hand, some district courts have taken a more lenient approach
to determining liability under Title IX. In Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School
District,67 the District Court for the Western District of Missouri developed the

1993).
62. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1401 (11th Cir.
1997), cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843); Rowinsky
v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
63. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006.
64. Id. at 1008-09.
65. Id. at 1016.
66. Id. at 1016.
67. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995). Following ajury verdict for the plaintiff,
the court granted judgment as a matter of law to the district because there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that the school "intentionally treated [the plaintiff]
differently than other students because of her sex ...

."

Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch.

Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1998). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, but stated:
We need not and do not determine whether public school districts or public
school officials may be held liable pursuant to Title IX for their failure to
prevent or remedy student-on-student sexual harassment. We assume without
deciding, for the purposes of this case only, that a school district may be held
liable under Title IX for such harassment. We therefore need not and do not
determine what elements a plaintiff must prove in order to hold a school
district liable in a Title IX student-on-student sexual harassment claim.
Id. at 779.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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following test:
The elements of a claim against a school district for student-on-student
sexual harassment in any educational program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance are: (1) the plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (2) the harassment was based on sex;
(3) the harassment occurred during the plaintiffs participation in an
educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance;
and (4) the school district knew of the harassment and intentionally
failed to take remedial action.6
The court developed this test by following Title VII standards already perfected
by the Supreme Court.' The district court held that the "standards developed
under Title VII to protect employees from sex discrimination by employers are
adaptable to protect persons participating in federally supported educational
programs from sex discrimination by the educational institution receiving federal
financial aid."70 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in
Franklin supported the use of Title VII standards in enforcing the antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX. Therefore, based on the test above, the
court denied the school's motion for summary judgment and held that a victim
of peer sexual harassment had a valid claim against the school under Title IX 2
The District Court for the Northern District of California also adopted a
similar test in Doe v. Petaluma.n However, this court constructed its elements
based strictly on Title VII standards, 4 determining that the school could be held
liable not only if the school knew of the harassment, but also if it should have
known of the harassment.75

68. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023.
69. Id. at 1022. The elements of a Title VII hostile environment claim are: (1)the
plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) the plaintiffwas subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5)
defendant knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. at 1021 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60
(1992)).
72. See id.
73. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
[T]he elements which Plaintiff must prove are that Plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome harassment based on her gender, that the harassment was so
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile educational environment, and that the
Defendants knew, or should in the exercise of their duties have known, of the
hostile environment and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action.
Id. at 1427.
74. Id.

75. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/7
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Not all courts have looked to case law to assist them in their rulings on peer
sexual harassment. Some courts faced with the issue have looked to the policy
of the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education (OCR) for
guidance.76

C. DepartmentofEducationInterpretationof Title IX
and PeerSexual Harassment
The OCR is the primary administrative agency with the power to enforce
the provisions of Title IX.77 Prior to 1996, the OCR had no official guidelines
regarding peer sexual harassment. However, due to the increased debate over
78
peer sexual harassment, it recently issued guidelines for schools to follow.

In 1996, the OCR created guidelines entitled "Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment" (Guidance) to assist educational
institutions in investigating and resolving claims of sexual harassment.79 The
Guidance was issued as a temporary policy outline after a finding that "[p]eer
sexual harassment is a form of prohibited sex discrimination where the harassing

76. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1381 (N.D.
Cal. 1997); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
77. The OCR's jurisdiction over sexual harassment is established by Section
106.3 l(b) of the Title IX regulations, which provides in relevant part:
(b) Specific prohibitions. Except as provided in this subpart,in providing any
aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
Treat one person differently from another in determining whether such
person satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of such
aid, benefit, or service;
Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits or
services in a different manner,
Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;
Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment;
Apply any rule concerning the domicile or residence of a student or
applicant, including eligibility for in-state fees and tuition;
Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by providing
significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which
discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit or service
to students or employees;
Otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity.
34 C.F.R. § 106.3 1(b) (1997).
78. Williams & Brake, supra note 44, at 439.
79. 61 Fed. Reg. 52,175 (1996).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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conduct creates a hostile environment." 80 The Guidance also stated:
A school will be liable for the conduct of its students that creates a
sexually hostile environment where (i) a hostile environment exists,
(ii) the school knows ("has notice") of the harassment, and (iii) the
school fails to take immediate and appropriate steps to remedy it.
Under such circumstances, a school's failure to respond to the
existence of a hostile environment within it's own programs or
activities permits an atmosphere of sexual discrimination to permeate
the educational program and results in discrimination prohibited by
Title IX. 1
After receiving numerous comments regarding this policy outline, the OCR
essentially adopted this same language in its final policy guidelines on March
13, 1997.82 One significant change that the OCR made to the policy was to
change the standard that the school "knows" of the harassment to "the school
knows or should have known of the harassment." 3
Although the OCR now clarifies that schools are liable for peer sexual
harassment the Eleventh Circuit's decision in the instant case shows that courts
continue to be divided about whether schools may be held liable under Title IX.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Davis v. Monroe County Board ofEducation,' the majority concluded
that Title IX does not cover claims against school boards based on school
officials' failure to stop peer sexual harassment.8 5 The court based this finding

80. Id.
81. Id. at 52,176.
82. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,

Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (Final Policy Guidance March 13,
1997). The exact language of the final policy is that a school will be liable for peer sexual
harassment if: "(i) a hostile environment exists in the school's programs or activities; (ii)
the school knows or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action." Id. at 12,039.
83. Id. Prior to the adoption of this policy in 1996, only OCR Letters of Finding
were issued regarding the OCR's position on peer sexual harassment, and some courts
were able to ignore the letters by finding that they "should be accorded little weight."

Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 165 (1996).
84. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept.
29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
85. Id.
at 1406.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/7
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on the conclusion that Congress did not clearly condition the receipt of federal
funding on the school's
acceptance of the responsibility of remedying peer
86
harassment.
sexual
The court first looked at the legislative history of Title IX and determined
that Congress did not discuss peer sexual harassment when they enacted the
statute.87 It further determined that Congress enacted Title IX under the power
of the Spending Clause of Article 1.88 Therefore, based on a previous Supreme
Court ruling, 9 the court found that Congress is required to "give potential
recipients unambiguous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they
accept federal funding." 9°
The court continued its analysis by considering whether or not the school
was given unambiguous notice that it could be held liable for failing to stop G.F.
from harassing LaShonda.9' The court first noted that neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress have taken any action that would place schools on notice of the
potential liability they may face for failing to prevent peer sexual harassment.92
The court then mentioned the OCR policy guidelines, but quickly determined
that they were issued after the alleged incident with LaShonda and consequently
provided no notice to the school.93
The court also showed some concern that LaShonda's complaint suggested
the only way a school may avoid liability is to immediately expel or suspend the
accused student.' The court noted that this would create a "Hobson's Choice"
where if the school does not suspend the student, the alleged victim may sue
them under Title IX. On the other hand, if the school suspends the student, the
suspended student may sue, "alleging that the official acted out of bias--out of
fear of a lawsuit." Based on statistics, the court noted that a substantial number
of lawsuits could be brought if schools were exposed to liability under Title IX
for peer sexual harassment.97 Because this liability may substantially affect the
school's decision to accept federal funding or not, the court concluded that
without clear unambiguous notice, the school cannot be held liable for peer
sexual harassment under Title IX.98

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1396-97.
88. Id. at 1398.
89. Pennhurst v. Halderrnan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
90. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1400-01.
93. Id. at 1404 n.23.
94. Id. at 1402.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1405.
98. Id.
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B. The Dissent
The dissent criticized the majority's opinion because "the majority ignores
the plain meaning of Title IX, as well as its spirit and purpose."" The dissent
argued there was no ambiguity in the language of Title IX and that, based on the
plain meaning of the statute, a school could be liable for failure to prevent peer
sexual harassment." ° The dissent determined that sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination and that the identity of the perpetrator, whether it was a
school employee or a student, is immaterial based on the language of the statute.
Thus, Monroe County Schools could be held liable for peer sexual harassment
under Title IX.''
The dissent then turned its attention to the legislative history of the statute,
finding that the lack of peer sexual harassment discussions in congressional
debates does not mean it was not within the broad intent of Congress to include
it in the statute."° The dissent pointed out that actions such as teacher-student
sexual harassment are valid Title IX claims after the Supreme Court's decision
in Franklin,and like peer sexual harassment, Congress never debated this issue
prior to the enactment of the statute. 3
Furthermore, the dissent argued the school had sufficient notice of liability
under Franklin,"4 where the Supreme Court ruled that "the notice requirement
for damages actions under the Spending Clause in Title IX cases is satisfied
where the alleged violation was intentional."'0 5 The dissent further noted that
Monroe County Schools intentionally discriminated against LaShonda when it
knowingly allowed G.F. to continue his behavior." In addition, the dissent
advocated that Title VII standards should be applied to Title IX claims, thus
extending sexual harassment liability for schools.
Based on the arguments above, the dissent concluded that LaShonda had
a valid Title IX claim against the Monroe County School Board because of the
school's failure to remedy a sexually hostile environment.'

V. COMMENT
The majority's decision in Davis,finding that schools are not liable for peer
sexual harassment under Title IX, is flawed because the majority fails to take

99. Id. at 1412 (Barket, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1413 (Barket, J., dissenting).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1413-14.
Id. at 1414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1415-19.
Id. at 1419.
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proper account of the Supreme Court's decision in Franklinand the Guidance
recently issued by the OCR. °
The majority's main argument to restrict liability was that schools were not
unambiguously informed of the potential liability."' The majority argued that
the schools were not given the opportunity to choose between accepting federal
funding and potential liability or not accepting federal funds and avoiding
potential Title IX liability."' Therefore, the court found that the school could
not be held liable."' However, the court failed to look properly at Franklin as
giving notice to schools of potential liability." 3
In Franklin,the Supreme Court held that where the discrimination alleged
to have violated Title IX is intentional, the "notice problem does not arise."" 4
The majority concedes this point, but states that the school's failure to remedy
peer sexual harassment is not intentional discrimination under Title Ix. 5 In so
concluding, the court refused to use Title VII standards to assist in the
interpretation of Title IX cases as the Supreme Court did in Franklin."6 If the
court had followed the Supreme Court's lead and recognized the use of Title VII
standards, it would have concluded, as many Title VII employment
discrimination cases have, that failure to take prompt action after being notified
of sexual harassment by peers is intentional discrimination.' Thus, the school
was sufficiently notified of the potential liability for peer sexual harassment.
The court's decision is also flawed because it failed to consider the effect
the OCR regulations will have on schools which are currently faced with sexual
harassment issues. Since March 13, 1997, when the OCR issued its final
guidelines concerning peer sexual harassment, schools have been
unambiguously notified of their potential liability under Title Ix." 8
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,"9 the
Supreme Court held that agency interpretations of statutes deserve a certain
degree of deference from the court. 20 The justices held that when a court is
interpreting a statute and Congress' intent is ambiguous,' 2' then the courts

109. Id. at 1399-1404.
110. Id. at 1406.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399-1401.
114. Id. at 1399.
115. Id. at 1401.
116. Id. at 1400 n.13.
117. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n., 51 F.3d 591,593 (5th
Cir. 1995); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 1994); Carr v. Allison Gas
Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988).
118. Seesupranote 83.
119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. Id. at 844.
121. Id. at 842-43.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 7

1062

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

should defer to agency regulations "unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."'
Given this ruling, a court would have to determine that the plain meaning
of Title IX answers the question of a school's liability for peer sexual harassment
to avoid the use of the OCR's guidelines. As stated in the dissenting opinion,
the plain meaning of the statute favors the interpretation that would hold a
school liable for student to student sexual harassment.12
Furthermore, if a court ruled that the plain meaning of the statute does not
indicate Congress' intent with respect to peer sexual harassment, the court would
need to look to the legislative history to determine that intent. As both the
majority and dissent discuss, Congress left no clear directive on the issue of peer
sexual harassment when enacting Title IX.24 Therefore, the Chevron standard
applies in peer sexual harassment cases, and a court must rule that the OCR
guidelines are "manifestly contrary" to Title IX in order to avoid finding a
school liable.125
Given the Supreme Court decisions regarding Title IX, it would be difficult
to find that peer sexual harassment is contrary to the statute. In Franklin v.
Gwinnett County PublicSchools, 26 the Court used Title VII principles to resolve
a Title DC claim,'2 7 and found that the Title VII principle expressed in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson 28 should be extended to Title IX cases when a teacher
sexually harasses a student. 29 It follows naturally then that applying Title VII
interpretations to Title IX cases cannot be "manifestly contrary" to the intent of
Congress. Therefore, when courts find that employer liability for failing to
remedy a hostile environment created by co-workers is not contrary to the intent
of Congress, 3 ' courts should then decide Title IX cases in a consistent manner.

122. Id. at 844.
123. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1412 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Barkett, J., dissenting), cert.granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97843). Judge Barkett recognized: "It is undisputed that the Monroe County School
System is a recipient of federal financial assistance.. ., [and] that hostile environment
sexual harassment is a form of intentional discrimination which exposes one sex to
disadvantageous terms or conditions to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
Id.
124. Id. at 1397, 1413.
125. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
126. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
127. Id. at 75.
128. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
129. Franklin,503 U.S. at 75.
130. Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F. 3d 978, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
employer liable for monetary damages under Title VII for failure to remedy sexual
hairassment by co-workers). See also Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d
340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employer must remedy co-worker sexual
harassment to avoid Title VII liability).
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Because peer sexual harassment cannot be contrary to the intent of
Congress, a court faced with this issue should defer to the OCR policy guidelines
for guidance.' 31 Courts will find that the OCR has provided "clear and
unambiguous notice" to schools regarding their potential liability under Title
IXV" The OCR clearly sets out factors for the school to consider when a student
harasses another student. 33 These factors specify what types of conduct are
considered harassment under the guidelines.' 34 Moreover, the OCR states that
the school is not responsible for the actions of the harassing student, but rather
the harassment when it knows
for its own discrimination for failing to remedy
35
or should have known of the harassment.
Since the OCR adopted its final policy in the spring of 1997, school
officials have been clearly notified of their potential liability under Title IX for
failure to remedy peer sexual harassment in their schools. Because of this
policy, schools should be prepared to make the decision between accepting
federal funds and following the guidelines, or rejecting the funds in order to
avoid peer sexual harassment liability under Title IX.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to recent court decisions regarding peer sexual harassment, there is
currently an equal circuit split regarding a school's liability under Title IX. 36
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit refused to take the position of the Davis court
and held that a school may be liable for peer sexual harassment if it had "actual
knowledge" of the harassment. 37 Additionally, to add to the confusion, the
Eighth Circuit recently declined to decide the issue of a school's liability under

131. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (Final Policy Guidance March 13,
1997).
132. Id.
133. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
61 Fed. Reg. 52172, 52175-77 (1996). Some of these factors are the age of the harasser
and victim, the relationship between the parties, if the conduct was welcomed by the
victim and by what degree, the frequency and duration of the conduct, the conduct's
affect on the victim, and the sexual nature of the conduct. Id.
134. Id. at 52175. The OCR notes that sexual harassment does not extend to nonsexual touching or other non-sexual contact. Id.
135. Id. at 52176.
136. Compare Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), and
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that students have Title XI claims against schools for peer sexual harassment),
with Davis y. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843), and Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S. Ct 165 (1996) (holding that
schools are not liable for peer sexual harassment under Title D).
137. Doe, 138 F.3d at 661.
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Title IX.118 Given these recent cases and the inadequate discussion of the OCR
Guidance in Davis,139 schools should continue to be cautious of possible liability
under Title IX until Congress or the Supreme Court takes steps to clarify their
obligations.
MEREDITH M. TODD

138. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 1998).
139. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1404 n.23.
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